

Technology now allows personalised pricing. If this came to be widely used, what effects should we expect?

The transition from universal pricing strategies to personalised pricing opportunities represents a change, and ultimately, a disruption of the classical mechanics of markets. In traditional markets, prices had been broadcasted invariably, with the exception of regional semantics, which permitted consumers to opt *in* or *out* based on their individual preferences, and utility of the products. However, the merge of advanced data monitoring and algorithmic processing is actively facilitating a movement towards first-degree price discrimination. In this *theoretical model*, which modern regulatory bodies are categorising as ‘surveillance pricing’, firms utilise immense datasets, obtained through vague techniques, to estimate consumer’s exact maximum willingness to pay for goods based on patterns and vast amounts of data at given periods of time. If a model such as this were to become widely integrated across global markets, concerning, regulated markets, it would necessitate restructuring of theories across macroeconomic perspectives, infrastructure of computing, and strategy within financial markets, and firms, across the globe.

Economic implications

The utmost important economic consequence of comprehensive, perhaps common, adoption of personalised pricing amongst markets is the eradication of consumer surplus. Under uniform pricing, or loosely region-based availability, market prices are compromisable, where individuals who value goods highly access financial surplus through paying less than their maximum threshold. An economy concentrated through algorithmic processing and pricing transfers the surplus towards the producer by the practice of tuning the cost of goods and services to replicate the utility threshold of each buyer. This attempt would theoretically allow for firms to maximise their extraction of revenue within a vast number of markets and situations. Incongruously, the theory of price discrimination similarly resolves inefficiencies within markets such as deadweight loss whereby uniform pricing excludes demographics whose willingness to pay falls below the market rate, however, above the marginal cost of production. A system dependent on algorithmic processing would reduce the price for aforementioned demographics ensuring that a transaction occurs, provided that the firm in question is able to acquire a profit through the transaction. Hence, wealthy consumers would face extreme scenarios of price escalation, low-income demographics could gain unprecedented access to vast amounts of goods and services that had been prohibitive.

Moreover, the execution of individualised pricing mechanisms would dispute the traditional tracking of macroeconomics as national indicators, such as the consumer price index (CPI), rely on the assumption that a basket of goods is standardised with relatively stable prices. If the cost of commodities essential to consumers fluctuates dynamically based on the algorithmic profile of the consumer, the calculation of a national inflation rate would become theoretically impossible with contemporary technology. Inflation would transform from a broad macroeconomic indicator to an individualised metric, complicating the monetary policy decisions and strategies of central banks.

Computational architecture

To allow for this economic model to become operational, Computer Science must turn towards real-time and adversarial reinforcement learning as legacy dynamic pricing systems would no longer be competent enough to handle these operations. Such systems rely on macroeconomic variables such as aggregate supply and demand instability and variations, adjusting the costs when necessary. In contrast, the profile of personalised pricing would require dimensional information digestion at overly individual levels. Algorithms would be compelled to process immense collections of contextual

sensor data surrounding consumers, whether this be precise geolocation data, latency with browsing, integration into digital ecosystems, and historical consumption patterns, to calculate immediate price elasticity of demand for goods and services.

The strain of such algorithms would precipitate an algorithmic race whereby data firms would contend to develop highly-able tracking algorithms for firm usage, whilst consumers, soliciting to preserve their purchasing power, would increasingly adopt automated software agents, designed to act as masks and intermediaries deploying obfuscation techniques to confuse data streams that such algorithms would rely upon. Furthermore, consumers would endeavour to exploit such mechanisms, reducing their theoretical purchasing willingness to acquire the highest consumer surplus. By simulating the browsing behaviour of consumers of more price-sensitive demographics, commerce would transition from human-to-business transactions into negotiations between artificial agents, requiring new protocols for digital security and market verification.

Adaptation of markets

Within the sector of business operations, the universality of personalised pricing would render traditional competitive strategies archaic. In the past, firms had utilised pricing as an indicator of quality and positioning within markets. If prices were to lose uniformity, brand equity and the perceived value of consumer experiences would become the sole differentiating factors. Businesses would be coerced to alter their propositions of value as they would no longer be able to rely on transparent and comparative pricing strategies to capture interest and share within markets.

Additionally, the shift of pricing mechanisms would carry an immense risk of highly discriminatory consumer behaviour and alienation. Consumers would experience increased sensitivity to firms and presented prices. Firms would likely mitigate the backlash and ‘public relations crises’ through shifting towards service-based architectures, reducing their supply of goods in necessity sectors to avoid disrepute. The focus of firms would shift away from the sale of identifiable products, and rather move into the provision of subscription models and software frameworks to permit businesses creating strategic opacity within evolving markets, yielding for it to become exceedingly difficult for consumers to compare costs of the underlying goods and services offered. It should be noted that the transition into personalised pricing would pierce and disrupt competitor analysis and intelligence on competing firms as analysis relies on the ability to monitor pricing strategies of opponent firms, without this factor, markets would become heavily opaque forcing corporations to deploy digital personas to probe and reverse-engineer algorithms of competitors, altering corporate strategy approach and focuses, innovating leading firms in the market research sector.

Regulatory responses

Implications of such technologies would trigger rigorous transformations and intervention from legislative aspects. In early 2026, scrutiny in regulatory perspectives had been noted regarding the opacity of algorithmic pricing models in firms such as Uber and Lyft for ride-hailing, Amazon for e-commerce, Ticketmaster for entertainment, amongst a plethora of air-travel providers such as Delta, British Airways, and more. Following market studies performed by the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which highlighted the significant risks associated with the utilisation of highly granular personal information to generate individualised prices, legislative bodies in many countries have expedited their investigative approaches and oversight into such practices.

In the initial quarter of 2026, policy and law makers across the United States introduced numerous pieces of legislation aimed to regulate, or entirely prohibit, surveillance pricing, commonly referred to

as ‘individualised pricing’ across disciplines. These legislative amendments emphasise the requirement for algorithmic transparency within largely impacted regions for consumers, furthermore, mandates such as New York’s Algorithmic Pricing Disclosure Act (N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349-a) now requires retail firms to disclose when a price has been determined through the utilisation of personal data and algorithmic processes. In addition to this, investigations taking place and overseen by the House Oversight Committee emphasise the largely shared concern regarding the ethical boundaries of the utilisation of protected class personal information and behavioural transmission to exploit vulnerabilities within consumer groups. Firms operating within this disgruntled framework must navigate increasingly convoluted landscapes of compliance models to ensure that their algorithmic processing does not violate expanding consumer protection laws, discouraging this behaviour to a limited extent.

Concluding arguments

In sum, the potential impact and obsolescence of the universal pricing strategies and techniques marks the introduction of a hyper-efficient, yet extremely volatile era of commercial behaviour and operations. The integration, whether widespread or secluded, of personalised and individual pricing models will optimise the market through the elimination of deadweight loss, yet threatens to fundamentally alter and threaten consumer trust in firms, consumer surplus, and the stability of macroeconomics through the dissolution of central bank power and access to analytical data sources. The fields of computer science, economics, and business would be highly consulted and required to collaboratively engineer frameworks for equity within markets and the processing of such operations and behaviour. Future global commerce operations would ultimately be defined not by the physical goods and services exchange itself, but by the boundaries of regulatory perspectives and computational power of firms and algorithms dictating their value to consumers.

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